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Note
RECENT PROPOSALS IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF RAPE: SIGNIFICANT REFORM
OR SEMANTIC CHANGE?
By

THOMAS J. LEWIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION
Until the latter part of the 1960's, the primary concern with the law of
rape was its adequacy for protecting men from unfounded and malicious
charges. However, in the last decade the law of rape and the accompanying
judicial and police procedures have been criticized severely because of the
way in which they contribute to an odious and humiliating treatment of
women. This criticism does not come only from a radical element within the
women's liberation movement. It is characteristic of a broad spectrum of
popular writing and scholarly research,' and has recently found support
among those who work within the criminal justice system in Canada, as well
as in Britain, Australia and the United States. This has resulted in a major
re-examination of the parts of the criminal law dealing with sexual offences,
and in numerous proposals for change.
A widely accepted basis for statutory reform is a reduction in the emphasis on the sexual nature of rape and related offences, and an increased
emphasis on the element of violence. Rape would be treated explicitly as a
subset of assault and not as an illegal sexual act. This is the position adopted
in a recent Canadian report on sexual offences, 2 as well as in the proposed
amendments to the CriminalCode contained in Bill C-52.3
The most objectionable consequences for the woman complainant in a
rape case are caused by the criminal justice system in those instances in
which it is expected that the question of her consent will arise, or when the
issue of consent actually is raised by the defendant. Unfortunately, it is not
clear that this problem can be resolved effectively by replacing the offence
o
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1 This shift of focus in scholarly writing is emphasized by Chappell, Geis and
Fogarty in their overview of the relevant literature. See the introduction to their Forcible
Rape: Bibliography (1974), 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 248.
2 Can., Sexual Offences, Working Paper 22 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978).
3 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977, S.C. 1976-77, c. 53.
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of rape with some form of assault. This strategy has been examined in
Britain, but it was not employed in 4the recent amendments to the British
legislation concerning sexual offences.
It is the thesis of this note that, in light of the prevailing concepts of
criminal liability and the resulting role of the consent standard, the proposed
emphasis on violence cannot be expected to alleviate the difficulties arising
from the existing law. It is submitted that, in fact, this emphasis presently
serves to obscure the essential elements of the law that must be addressed.
In order to support this contention, it may be helpful to begin by reviewing briefly the proposals of the report on sexual offences and the subsequent
provisions of Bill C-52. This will be followed by an examination of the place
of consent in existing Canadian law, and the difficulties that consent poses for
the proposed reforms. Central to these difficulties is the highly subjective
element of mens rea in criminal liability, and, to clarify this aspect of consent, the recent British experience will be examined in some detail.
REFORM PROPOSALS
One of the more recent studies to focus on the problem of redefining
rape is the report on sexual offences by the Law Reform Commission of
Canada, which draws attention to two ways of conceptualizing rape. The first
is to consider those sexual activities designated as offences as a subset of a
broader category of sexual activity. 5 This approach is presently reflected in
Part IV of the Criminal Code, entitled "Sexual Offences, Public Morals, and
Disorderly Conduct." Rape is treated as sexual intercourse that occurs in the
absence of valid consent, and is, accordingly, prohibited. The Working Paper
proposes that the offence of rape should be reconceptualized as a violation
of the integrity of the person, and treated as a form of assault.
II.

An assault is essentially an intentional application of force on another, or an
attempt or threat to apply force without that person's consent. Rape is the intentional application of force in order to accomplish sexual intercourse without the
victim's consent. On this basis, it can be seen that all of the legally defined elements of rape are contained in the concept of assault, with sexual intercourse
being a specific ingredient in addition to the force applied or threatened by the
accused.7

The report suggests that to conceptualize rape in this way places primary
focus "on the assault or the violation of the integrity of the person rather
than the sexual intercourse.""
The Working Paper does note that even though rape is a species of
assault, it is set apart from assault in at least two very important ways. It is
the only kind of assault that can impregnate a woman. Furthermore, it lacks
the essential and highly valued feature of consent that is present in an act of
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 82 (U.K.).
5 Working Paper 22, supra note 2, at 19-24.
6 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
7 Working Paper 22, supra note 2, at 15-16.
8
ld. at 16.

4
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consensual sexual intercourse. Although assault is the application of force
without consent, the question of consent is seldom at issue in other types of
assaultY Despite these special features, the Working Paper concludes that
rape should be subsumed under a more general offence of sexual assault.
Accordingly, the report recommends that the existing Criminal Code be
amended to replace the offence of rape with the offence of sexual assault as
follows:
(I) Every one who has sexual contact with a person without that person's consent
is guilty of an offence of sexual assault.
(2) For the purposes of this section "sexual contact" includes any touching of the
sexual organs of another or the touching of another with one's sexual organs
that is not accidental and that is offensive to the sexual dignity of that person.
(3) In determining the sentence of a person convicted under this section the judge
shall consider all of the circumstances and consequences of the offence including whether there has been penetration or violence.' 0

This reformulation is said to avoid the problems that would be created by
simply relabelling rape as assault, because it does not draw a distinction "between unwanted sexual contact and unwanted sexual penetration for the purposes of substantive law, but rather provides for consideration of aggravating
circumstances of the assault when the sentence is determined."" The law
would then be consistent with the principle of the right of every person to be
free from physical assault.
The report suggests that there is some doubt as to whether this reformulation "would be more effective in terms of increased protection for the dignity and inviolability of the person, or whether its greatest value would lie in
alleviating the distress, humiliation and stigmatization that is associated with
the present law. . . ..,,2 Unfortunately, the relevant question may not be one

of determining which of these purposes will be better served but, rather,
whether the reformulation will foster the attainment of either goal to any
degree whatsoever.
The concerns of the Law Reform Commission are reflected in the proposed changes to the Criminal Code in Bill C-52, which was given first reading on May 1, 1978. If enacted, these amendments would replace the offence
of rape with the offences of indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault.
These basic changes would require a repeal of sections 143, 144, 145 and
149 of the existing Code, which specify the separate offences of rape and
indecent assault, and the replacement of these sections with a new section
containing a broadened definition of indecent assault, so as to include the
present offence of rape. The proposed amendment reads as follows:
149.

(1) Every one who indecently assaults another person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.
(2) An accused who is charged with an offence under subsection (1) or
section 149.1 may be convicted if the evidence establishes that the accused
did anything to the other person with his or her consent that, but for such

9 Id. at 20.
10 Id. at 22.

11 Id.at 21.
2

1

Id. at 18.
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consent, would have been an indecent assault or an aggravated indecent
assault, if such consent was obtained by personating the spouse of the other
person or by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and
quality of the act, or was extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm.
149.1 Every one who indecently assaults another person is, where the indecent
assault results in severe physical or psychological damage to that other person, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
149.2 For the purposes of sections 149 and 149.1 and without restricting the
generality of the term "indecent assault", an indecent assault includes sexual
penetration of any bodily orifice.
149.3 No prosecution shall be instituted under section 149 or 149.1 in respect of
an offence alleged to have been committed by a person against his or her
spouse unless the spouse were living separate and apart at the material
time.

According to the then Minister of Justice, the Honourable Ron Basford,
the purpose of these amendments is to emphasize the violent nature of rape,
in order to minimize the trauma experienced and the stigma that often attaches
to rape victims, and to prevent the victim from virtually being placed on trial
herself.' 3 The basic question is whether these amendments would grapple
substantially with the problems that arise from the existing law of rape. However, any answer to that question presupposes an accurate understanding of
the present law of rape and particularly of the pivotal role of the "consent
standard."'1 4 Much of the criticism of the existing law arises from the use of
the consent standard, and the changes proposed in Bill C-52 are designed to
alleviate precisely these difficulties. If the provisions of Bill C-52 are to improve the situation of women who allege rape, and thereby be a more effective deterrent to rape, the changes in the law must be substantive rather than
merely semantic. Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt that this is the case.
At present, section 143 of the Criminal Code defines rape as follows:
A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person
who is not his wife,
(a) without her consent, or
(b) with her consent if the consent
(i) is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm,
(ii) is obtained by personating her husband, or
(iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and
quality of the act. 15
Consent is the crux of the matter.

Ostensibly, the proposed amendments to the Code could constitute a
major change in the law in Canada by reducing the role of consent substantially. However, in order to be able to separate substance from semantics, it is
necessary to explore the more general offence of "assault" in the Criminal

13 For accounts of the news conference held by the Minister of Justice, see The
Globe and Mail, May 2, 1978 at 1, and the Toronto Star, May 2, 1978 at 1.
14 Part IV, section D of Chappell, Geis and Fogarty, supra note 1, lists much of the
relevant work on the consent standard prior to 1972. Also see Scutt, The Standard oj
Consent in Rape, [1976] N.Z.L.J. 462, and her closely related article, A Disturbing Case
of Consent in Rape (1976), 40 J. Crim. L. 206, 271.
15 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
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Code. Indecent assault (however it is defined) is a subset of the more general
category of "assault," which is found in section 244 of the Criminal Code:
A person commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another person or with consent, where it is obtained
by fraud, he applies force intentionally to the person of the other, directly or
indirectly;
(b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or gesture, to apply force to the person
of the other, if he has or causes the other to believe upon reasonable grounds
that he has present ability to effect his purpose; or
(c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts
or impedes another person and begs. 1

It is not, however, made explicit in the statements of what the Bill is
expected to accomplish that assault is the direct or indirect use of force
without consent. To obtain a conviction for either indecent assault or aggravated indecent assault, the prosecution would have to be able to establish as
a fact that the complainant did not consent, or that consent was obtained by
fraud. In instances of severe physical damage to the complainant this would
not be difficult to establish-but it is not difficult under the law of rape as it
presently exists. It is in the absence of signs of force, which are inconsistent
with consent, that the present law permits the defence to cross-examine the
woman in what is often a deplorable and extremely humiliating manner. However, because lack of consent is also essential in establishing that the accused
is guilty of assault, it is difficult to see how the proposed amendments to the
Criminal Code can be expected to alter in substance the nature of the trial
process, whether the charge be rape or some form of assault.
The essential element of rape is intercourse without consent, while the
essential element of assault is violence or force without consent. The change
of wording from "rape" to "assault" avoids neither the issue of consent nor
the problems to which it gives rise. To begin to appreciate the virtually intractable nature of these problems, more needs to be said both about the
controlling concept of liability, and about the basic rights that underlie the
consent standard.
III. THE NATURE OF CONSENT
The redefinition of rape as assault cannot amount to a substantive change
because it does not avoid the problem of sorting out the interconnected decisions arising from the principle of the equal right of choice, which provides
the basis for so much demeaning cross-examination. To be clear about why
this is so, it may help to look at part of the argument of Clark and Lewis,
who advocate the redefinition of rape as assault. They draw an extended
comparison between sexual intercourse and exchanges of money.
Sexual intercourse is the only form of social transaction which is not automatically
redefined by the presence of physical coercion. All exchanges of money between
one person and another are monetary in nature, but an exchange of money to
which the owner freely consents is referred to as a "gift", whereas an exchange
of money which the recipient effects through physical coercion is referred to as a

16 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as am. by R.S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 21. This section of
the Code is not altered by Bill C-52.
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"theft". And it is assumed that where the recipient used or threatened physical
force, the donor did not consent to the act in question. Gifts and thefts are both
monetary transactions, but it is the differences, rather than the similarities, between
them which are thought to be important-important enough to be marked by a
verbal distinction.
In the case of monetary exchanges, the mere presence of physical coercion
negates any presumption of consent on the part of the giver and hence makes the
issue of consent prima facie irrelevant. Why is this not also the rule with physically coerced acts of sexual intercourse? Only in the case of sexual transactions
do we refuse to acknowledge that the relevant issue is the offender's behaviour
rather than the victim's state of mind. In rape, as in theft, the use or threat of
physical force ought to negate any presumption of consent on the victim's part.17

They conclude that "the same standards which apply to other acts characterized by the threat or reality of physical coercion should also apply to acts
of sexual intercourse"' 8 and, thus, that rape should be viewed as essentially
assaultive in nature.
There are two basic problems with this comparison between monetary
and sexual transactions. First, exchanges of money within our society, in all
but the most nominal sums, are made either in public places, or in a manner
that can be verified publicly. If disputes arise, the essentially public nature of
these transactions makes it possible to ascertain rather easily whether they
arose from the consent of the parties involved. Secret or non-verifiable monetary transactions are not the norm, and their very existence gives rise to
suspicions that they stem from conditions incompatible with consent, such
as fraud, blackmail, extortion, or threat of physical violence. In contrast,
sexual transactions such as intercourse are generally private; indeed, they cannot legally be public. Thus, in the absence of evidence of physical violence,
if a woman claims that intercourse occurred without her consent, and this
claim is seriously contested, there is a difficulty of quite a different magnitude
than for most contested monetary transactions in establishing the actual nature of the decisions of the complainant and the accused or the nature of the
decision as it appeared, as distinct from what it might really have been.
The second problematic element is the instrumental nature of most
monetary transactions. Most monetary transactions are not gifts, but transfers
of money for a commodity or definite service. Thus, whether public or private, an initial assessment of the voluntary nature of the transaction can be
made in terms of the appropriateness of the quid pro quo. For example, if a
householder were to pay $10,000 for aluminum siding that could be purchased elsewhere for $2,000, there would be grounds for suspecting that the
transaction resulted from behaviour that was not entirely free from misrepresentation or even intimidation. Upon investigation these suspicions may not
be substantiated, but the instrumental nature of the transaction does provide
a quid pro quo, the adequacy of which can serve as an indicator of circumstances inconsistent with consent. Sexual transactions, however, are not fundamentally instrumental. Consensual sexual relations may be considered a
transaction, but a transaction of this nature is not normally a means of ac17 Clark and Lewis, Rape: the price of coercive sexuality (Toronto: The Women's
Press, 1977) at 163-64.
18 Id. at 165.
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quiring some specific commodity or service. Because this is so, it is not
possible to assess the adequacy of a quid pro quo to form a preliminary
judgment about the consensual nature of the transaction.
These two differences between monetary and sexual transactions are
both relevant to establishing a presumption of credibility in monetary disputes. Thus, if there is no formal public record of a monetary transaction
or evidence that the alleged transaction did not result in the exchange of
a relatively normal commodity or service, then there is prima facie evidence for suspecting some form of coercion. If fraud or theft was to be
alleged by the person who had paid out the money, and if he could establish that he had in fact paid out the sum of money, the unusual circumstances would provide a basis for his credibility. In this context, any independent evidence of intimidation would be very persuasive. In the absence of
evidence of violence, the generally private and non-instrumental nature of
sexual transactions largely removes the possibility of the complainant's enjoying an initial presumption of credibility if the accused admits intercourse but
claims consent. Because what has occurred does not on the surface deviate
from normal, or at least legal, sexual decisions, the balance of credibility is
appropriately much more even, with no presumption in favour of the complainant or the accused. This would not be the case if there were evidence of
violence. It is in instances in which there is no evidence of violence, however,
that the truly difficult problems arise. A clear line must also be drawn between the threat of violence and evidence of actual violence, for allegations
of threats made in private, if denied by the accused, cannot be taken as evidence of assault independent of an assessment of the credibility of both
parties. 19
There are basically two ways in which the law might respond to the
inherent problem of consent in sexual offences: it might focus on an objective
interpretation of whether consent was present, or, alternatively, seek to determine whether consent was present in a subjective sense.
An established basis for a defence to the charge of rape is the claim
that the accused believed that the complainant consented to intercourse. If
this claim is to be assessed at the objective level, the issue to be decided is
not whether the accused held the belief (albeit mistakenly), but whether the
belief was held reasonably. This objective character of mens rea has a solid
basis in common law and is applicable in most jurisdictions in the United
States. 20 However, as statutory definitions of rape are revised, and greater
emphasis is placed on the conduct of the accused, the precise nature of his
intentions is opened to greater scrutiny. This is reflected in the treatment of
mens rea in the Model Penal Code,21 which defines four levels of criminal
19 Most cases of alleged rape that are reported to the police do not involve any
direct form of violence. As a result, this type of evidentiary difficulty is a frequent
problem. Of all complaints of rape in Toronto in 1970, only thirty-two percent of the
complainants alleged that they suffered physical violence of any kind and only thirtyseven percent claimed that they had been threatened verbally with violence. Id. at 67-68.
20 U.S. v. Short, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954); State v. Dizon, 390 P.
2d 759, 47 Hawaii 444 (S.Ct. 1964).
21
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft (Philadelphia: A.L.I., 1962) at 24, Article 2.
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intention: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence, and
assigns each level of intention to different crimes or different elements within each crime."-" As applied to rape, an adequate defence would be a mistaken belief that the complainant has consented, if this mistake of fact was
not made recklessly.23 Despite the substantial impact of the Model Penal
Code on the re-drafting of rape statutes throughout the United States, reasonableness still is generally required if a mistaken belief in consent is claimed. 2'1
In England, the decision in R. v. Morgan2 5 rejected the requirement of
reasonable belief, and established that in the case of rape the question of
consent must be assessed in a subjective manner. The Morgan decision
caused a public outcry, which in turn precipitated amendments clarifying the
law of rape. To see why the Morgan decision should have caused so much
concern about the consequences of the consent standard for women, it is necessary to have some acquaintance with the facts of the case, and with the nature
of the judicial reasoning based on these facts.
Morgan, a married man, had spent the evening drinking with three
younger male friends, all of whom were strangers to his wife. He invited all
three to his house to have intercourse with his wife, telling them that she
would not object, and that if she seemed to object, and even if she struggled
somewhat, it was only because this excited her. The three men accompanied
Morgan to his home, woke Mrs. Morgan and wrestled her into an adjoining
room, while (according to Mrs. Morgan) she struggled and screamed to her
sons to call for help. She was held on a bed while a number of sexual acts
were performed, and each of the three men had intercourse with her. When
they left, her husband forced her to have intercourse with him. Immediately
thereafter she ran out of the house, drove to a hospital and made a complaint
of rape. Both the medical evidence and the subsequent statements of the
accused to the police substantially corroborated the details provided by Mrs.
Morgan. However, at the trial the defendants repudiated most of their previous statements to the police, and, although they admitted their actions, they
claimed that once in the adjoining bedroom she had consented to intercourse
and, indeed, had been a willing and active participant. The defence of the
three younger men was that, despite the unusual circumstances, she had consented to intercourse, and, even if she had not consented, they believed that
she had consented. In either event, they could not be guilty of rape.
As part of his summing-up, the trial judge instructed the jury that:
mhe prosecution have to prove that each defendant intended to have sexual intercourse with this woman without her consent. Not merely that he intended to have
intercourse with her but that he intended to have intercourse without her consent.
Therefore if the defendant believed or may have believed that Mrs. Morgan consented to him [sic] having sexual intercourse with her, then there would be no
22

Id. at 25-26, §2.02.

The level of intention required is not prescribed in the definition of rape so that
the general provision that recklessness is sufficient to establish culpability is applicable.
Id. at 142-43, Article 213, §213.1 and at 26-27, Article 2, §2.02(3).
23

24 See Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape

(1975), 61 Va. L. Rev. 1500 at 1533-36.
25 R. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 192, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, 61 Cr. App. R. 123
(H.L.). For the Court of Appeal decision, see [1976] A.C. 182, [1975] 1 All E.R. 8.
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such intent in his mind and he would be not guilty of the offence of rape, but
such a belief must be honestly held by the defendant in the first place. He must
really believe that. And, secondly, his belief must be a reasonable belief; such a

belief as a reasonable man would entertain if he applied his mind and thought
about the matter. It is not enough for a defendant to rely upon a belief, even

though he honestly held it, if it was completely fanciful; contrary to every indica-

tion which could be given which would carry some weight with a reasonable
man."O

The jury rejected the defence position. The three friends were convicted of
rape and Morgan was convicted of aiding and abetting.
The defendants appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial
judge had made a mistake in law in his direction to the jury when he held
that their belief in consent must be reasonable. They contended that an
honest belief in consent was incompatible with an intent to commit rape,
whether or not the belief was based on reasonable grounds. The Court of
Appeal agreed with the direction of the trial judge and rejected the appeals,
although it did reduce the sentences in each case. The Court of Appeal also
gave the appellants permission to appeal to the House of Lords on the
grounds that a point of law of general public importance was involved, that
is, "whether in rape the defendant can properly be convicted notwithstanding
woman consented if such belief was not
that he in fact believed that ' the
27
based on reasonable grounds.
By majority decision, the Law Lords held that "a man ought not to be
convicted of rape unless the prosecution proved that he intended to do what
the law forbids, i.e., have intercourse with a woman without her consent--or
being reckless as to whether she consented or not. '28 As explained by Lord
Hailsham, recklessness was to be understood as the accused's intending to
have intercourse "not caring whether the victim be a consenting party or not,
[for] that was equivalent on ordinary principles to an intent to do the prohibited act without the victim's consent. '2 9 From this it was held to follow
that, if a genuine, albeit mistaken, belief on the part of the accused that the
woman had consented could be demonstrated, the accused could not be guilty
of rape. As to the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that the woman
had consented, strictly speaking his belief need not be reasonable but simply
genuine. Reasonableness was by no means irrelevant; indeed, the Law Lords
emphasized that "the more reasonable were the grounds put forward for this
,,30 This
belief, the more likely would a jury be to accept its genuineness.
notwithstanding, the nub of the question is still the genuineness of the belief.
A conviction could not properly be obtained if the jury were to view the
defendant as having genuinely, but unreasonably, believed that the woman
had consented.
Although the Lords agreed with the appellants on the point of law and
concluded that the jury had been misdirected, the convictions were allowed
20

27

As quoted by the Court of Appeal at 187 (A.C.), 11 (All E.R.).
Id. at 192 (A.C.), 15 (All E.R.).

28

Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (Heilbron Report) (Cmnd.

6352, 1975) at 6.
29 Id. at 7.
80 Id.
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to stand. The Law Lords concluded that despite the misdirection there had
not been a miscarriage of justice because, if properly instructed (as it admittedly had not been), the jury still would have convicted. Despite this outcome, a public outcry occurred because of the importance attributed by the
Law Lords to what the accused actually believed about the woman's consent
as distinct from what it was reasonable to believe. Some of the press depicted
the ruling as a "rapists' charter," and two private member's bills were submitted in the House of Commons to change the existing law.a'
So great was the outcry that the Home Secretary found it necessary to
appoint the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, chaired by the Honourable
Mine Justice Heilbron. The Heilbron Report (officially styled the Report of
the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape) was presented to the British Parliament in December of 1975.
The Heilbron Report recommended a number of changes in the conduct
of rape trials. These proposed changes included a provision for the guarantee
of anonymity for those who allege rape (except in special circumstances),
and the recommendation that "[t]he previous sexual history of the complainant with men other than the accused should be inadmissible, except with
the leave of the trial Judge on application made to him in the absence of the
jury. '32 On the specific point of law at issue in the Morgan case, the Heilbron
Report supported the ruling of the Law Lords. It did recommend that a
statutory definition of rape should be provided to clarify (but not change)
the existing law, and that this statutory definition should be framed to
emphasize the importance of recklessness as a mental element in the crime of
rape. 33 It also recommended that the definition should emphasize that lack
of consent, not violence, is the crux of the matter, and that, in cases where
the question of belief is raised, the statute should declare that:
Mhe issue which the jury have to consider is whether the accused at the time
when sexual intercourse took place believed that she was consenting, and make it
clear that, while there is no requirement of law that such a belief must be based
on reasonable grounds, the presence or absence of such grounds is a relevant consideration to which the jury should have regard, in conjunction with all other
evidence, in considering whether the accused genuinely had such a belief. 34

The Heilbron Report was well received by legal commentators as being
an accurate rendering of the law of rape as it currently stood in Britain, and
for suggesting modifications that would, on the whole, constitute improvements in the legal process, especially as it affects women. 3z
The amendments to the Sexual Offences Act followed the Heilbron
Report recommendations very closely, particularly in the matter of the major
point of law raised by the Morgan case. Thus, the law of rape as interpreted
by the Law Lords remains unaltered but clarified:
[A] man commits rape if(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the
intercourse does not consent to it; and
311 d.at 41.
32 Id. at 23-24; also see id. at 36.
33 Id.at 14.
34

Id.

35 Smith,

The Heilbron Report, [1976] Crim. L. Rev. 97.
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(b) at the time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is
reckless as to whether she consents to it; ... 36

With respect to the claim that the defendant believed that the woman had
consented, the amended Act specifies that:
[I]f at a trial for a rape offence the jury has to consider whether a man believed
that a woman was consenting to sexual intercourse, the presence or absence of
reasonable grounds for such a belief is a matter to which the jury is to have
regard, in conjunction
with any other relevant matters, in considering whether he
37
so believed.

As was made clear in the amendments, consent is the critical issue in
defining rape, and "reasonableness" of belief that the woman consented is
only one factor among others that must be considered in assessing whether
the defendant genuinely did believe that the woman had consented. The
amendments clearly presume heavy reliance on subjective liability; that is,
conviction is justified only if the jury is convinced that (a) the woman did
not consent and (b) this was understood by the defendant, or he proceeded
so recklessly as to disregard whether she consented. Only if these conditions
are met can it be concluded that the defendant chose to do what the law
forbids. 38
English and Canadian reliance on subjective liability is by no means
unique to this area of criminal law, but the way in which the complainant
herself frequently seems to be on trial in rape cases is due to a kind of compounding of subjectivity. This is so because of the necessity of distinguishing
the criminal act of rape from lawful sexual intercourse. As the Heilbron
Report states:
[The crime of rape] involves an act-sexual intercourse-which is not in itself
either criminal or unlawful, and can, indeed, be both desirable and pleasurable.
Whether it is criminal depends on complex considerations, since the mental states
of both parties and the influence of each upon the other as well as their physical
interaction have to be considered and are sometimes difficult to interpret-all the
more so since normally the act takes place in private .... There may well be
circumstances where each party interprets the situation differently, and it may be
quite impossible to determine with any confidence which interpretation is right. 39

To distinguish rape from intercourse requires a sorting out of both persons' actions, intentions, and understanding in order to determine the outcome of two decisions: first, whether the woman chose to have intercourse;
and second, whether the accused chose to have intercourse knowing that the
woman did not consent to intercourse. Failure to establish that the woman
did not choose to have intercourse means that conviction is not possible,

because the accused cannot have performed an illegal act. However, because
the test to be applied is one of subjective liability, before it can be demonThe Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 82, s. 1(1) (U.K.).
37 The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 82, s. 1(2) (U.K.).
38For an overview of the impact of the Morgan decision in Australia, see Scutt,
The Australian Aftermath of D.P.P. v. Morgan (1977), 25 Chitty's L.J. 289. Berger's
recent and comprehensive article, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom (1977), 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1, distinguishes between American law and
British law in light of the Morgan decision. She concludes (at 61-62) that the prevailing
American view does not accord well with the more subjective element embedded in the
basic structure of criminal law. Also see Note, supra note 24, at 1533.
30 Heilbron Report, supra note 28, at 2.
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strated that the accused chose to do what the law forbids, it is necessary to
show that he believed, or understood, that the complainant did not consent.
If he genuinely (not necessarily reasonably) believed that she consented,
even if in fact she did not, then he cannot be held liable for choosing to have
intercourse without consent.
In many instances, particularly if there is evidence of substantial physical
violence, the requirements of the law pose no additional problem, because
the accused cannot credibly base his defence on consent. However distasteful
it is for the victim to have to testify to what happened, at least she is spared
the challenge to her veracity and basic integrity that necessarily arises when
consent is claimed by the accused. In the absence of such unequivocal evidence, on the other hand, (in many instances evidence of the use of physical
force may well be consistent with consent) determining the intentions and
understanding of the two persons becomes the crucial, and frequently intractable, problem. 40 The accused is allowed to attempt to convince the jury of
the disposition of the woman to consent to intercourse with him, so that if
she denies the allegation of consent she will not be believed (she may indeed
be lying), or, if she is believed, her demonstrated disposition to consent
(even if it is believed by the jury that she did not consent) is sufficiently
well established to make it possible for the jury to conclude that the accused
(without being reckless) genuinely did not at the time understand that she
did not consent. The law of rape provides the basis for this type of defence,
but it is often a wretchedly demeaning process for a woman to endure, and
it was the announced purpose of Bill C-52 to reduce the frequency of its
occurrence.
The criterion of subjective liability requires close scrutiny of the actions,
intentions, and understanding of both the complainant and the accused. This
is due to the legal importance of the decisions of both persons. This importance, however, is itself a result of the right of each person to make such a
decision. If a complainant were clearly below the age required to have a
recognized right to consent to intercourse, the nature of her decision would
not have to be examined closely because she would be denied the right to
make a legally significant decision. In such circumstances, a man accused of
rape cannot base his defence on the contention that she consented (even
though he may reasonably and genuinely believe that she did) because the
young woman is, by reason of age, unable in law to consent. The alleged
belief that she did consent is thereby robbed of its legal force, and as a result
the complainant is spared the ordeal of denying the allegation that she did
consent, or that she did seem to consent.
The need to inquire into the decisions or apparent decisions of both
persons rests on the legal status of their decisions. Underlying their legal
right to make a decision is the highly valued norm or principle of personal
volition and personal autonomy. Briefly put, this means that, with only minor
exceptions, all adults are recognized as having a basic jurisdiction over themselves, and thus they have a wide sphere of action in which they have a right
40 Leigh, Sado-Masochism, Consent, and the Reform of the Criminal Law (1976),
39 Mod. L. Rev. 130.
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of choice. This includes religious, economic, educational, political, artistic,
and sexual activities. 4' Because this principle of autonomy has been extended
to include women as well as men, the right of choice to which it gives rise has
now become, essentially, an equal right of choice. Thus, one's obligations in
general, and particularly those obligations that are supported by legal enforcement, are seen as originating in a set of implicit or explicit choices across
a broad range of human concerns. Accordingly, legal liability stems from a
refusal to meet an obligation that originated in a choice, or from choosing to
act in such a way as to infringe on an area of concern that is subject to the
right of choice of another. Operating within this context of an equal right of
choice, the law of rape is applied to a situation in which both parties have an
equal right to choose to have intercourse, and both have a right not to suffer
legal punishment unless it is demonstrated that they chose to do what the law
prohibits-that is, to infringe or violate this right of choice of the other. It is
the equal right of choice that underlies the legal recognition of the right of
both persons to make decisions about intercourse, and thereby necessitates an
examination of both persons' decisions.
Intercourse without consent is accepted as a serious violation of a
woman's rights. It is a violation not only of her body, but also of her very
sense of self. Even in the absence of serious bodily harm it is a violation of
an important right closely connected to one's sense of self or self-worth. To
take this sense of personal autonomy seriously, and to insist that it be reflected in the law, has the result of giving legal standing to a woman's right
of choice, but it also has the effect of buttressing the equal right of choice
as it applies to the defendant. It would be an equally serious violation of his
right of choice if he were to be convicted of a serious violation of the right
of a woman, without scrupulous attention being paid to the question of
whether he did in fact choose to do what was forbidden.
Because the right of choice is applicable both to the complainant and
to the accused, the emphasis on the seriousness of rape as a violation of this
right also serves to entrench the right of the accused not to be held legally
culpable except as a result of his actual choice. Moreover, it is this right that
permits the defence to press so hard to demonstrate that the complainant did
consent and, failing this, that her behaviour was such that the accused believed that she did consent. The more solidly entrenched this right is, the
more odious the trial process is likely to be for the woman. The very principle that establishes a woman's jurisdiction over her own body is the same
41 The history of the application of the right of choice to political and economic
matters is now an old story. However, the implications of viewing virtually all human
relationships in this manner are much less clearly sorted out. For a recent effort along
these lines, see Gauthier, The Social Contract as Ideology (1977), 6 Philosophy and

Public Affairs 130. Gauthier contends that radical contractualism, first formulated by

Thomas Hobbes, has become a basic presumption of our thought such that "... our
thoughts and activities, insofar as they concern ourselves and our relationships, are best
understood by supposing that we treat all of these relationships as if they were con-

tractual. Only the relation of hostility is excluded from the scope of the contract, and
only it is natural to man. All other human relationships are treated as essentially similar

in character, and all are conventional, the product of human agreement." (at 135).
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principle that gives legal standing to the defence counsel's attempt to discredit
the complainant.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The reformulation of rape as a special form of assault does exhibit a
conceptual consistency, and to this there can be no objection. However, in
advocating this change, the Canadian report on sexual offences offers nothing
persuasive to substantiate the prediction that change of this kind will significantly alleviate the problems that it identifies. Indeed, it expresses the desired
improvement in very tentative language. In contrast, the similar proposals of
Bill C-52 were accompanied by much more extravagant statements about
what could be achieved by redefinition. These expectations are entirely without foundation, because the issue of consent is not to be avoided and, in light
of the Morgan decision, must be assessed in a very subjective manner. This
is entirely consistent with the right of choice that is at the heart of contemporary concepts of criminal liability, but it can only reinforce the objectionable aspects of the investigative and judicial procedures for the complainant.
When Bill C-52 was given first reading, its amendments on rape were
very well received by the organizations most concerned with the impact of
the existing law on women. Despite the fact that the Bill died on the order
paper at the end of the last session of Parliament, it indicates the direction
of future change by announcing the trends in government policy. If the proposals on rape were to become law, their non-substantial nature eventually
would become clear to those who now believe that they have some substance.
Should this occur, it would undoubtedly spark a renewed militancy, with the
perception of the basic inequity of the law compounded with a feeling of
betrayal. However, in the interim-that is, until the lack of substance becomes clear-attention will be diverted from the task of grappling with the
existing law to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of the accused
and the impact of the legal procedures on the complainant. The tightening
of the restrictions on the defence lawyer's examination of the complainant's
sexual history, and the elimination of the corroboration requirement as part
of the necessary instructions to the jury, are both examples of recent changes
in precisely this direction. It is possible that piecemeal changes of this type
will not be adequate to overcome the difficulties faced by the complainant.
If this proves to be the case, then reliance on the underlying principle of
subjective liability may have to be re-examined. To move away from subjective liability and towards objective liability would probably require specific42
legislation to set the law in Canada clearly apart from the law in Britain.
It is not entirely clear that an explicit divergence from the British situation
is warranted, and it may therefore be premature to take a definite position.
What is clear is that there is nothing to be gained by having false hopes
raised, and basic legal principles obfuscated, by the proposals in Bill C-52.

42 For an argument that precisely this kind of change is required, see Curley,
Excusing Rape (1976), 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 325.

